Grover's operator in the two-qubit case can transform a basis into its conjugated basis. A permutation operator can transform a state in the two conjugated bases into its orthogonal state. These properties are included in a threshold quantum protocol. The proposed threshold quantum protocol is secure based the proof that the legitimate participators can only eavesdrop 2 bits of 3 bits operation information on one two-qubit with error probability 3/8. We propose a scheme to detect the Trojan horse attack without destroying the legal qubit.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a secure multi-party computation [1, 2] , n participants, P 1 , P 2 , ...P n , compute and reveal the result of the multi-variable function f (x 1 , x 2 , ...x n ), where x i is a secret input provided by P i . It is also necessary to preserve the maximum privacy of each input x i . The menace of input leakage comes from eavesdroppers and the dishonest participants. In contrast to the eavesdroppers outside, the dishonest participants have many advantages to attack another's input. As pointed out in Ref. [3] , if multiparty scheme is secure for the dishonest participants, it is secure for any eavesdropper. [4, 5] , multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocols [6, 7, 8] and threshold quantum protocol [9] have been proposed. Lucamarini and Mancini [5] showed that the QSDC protocols [4, 5] are quasisecure to eavesdropper. Deng et al. [7] showed a Trojan horse attack scheme against MQSS protocol proposed by Ref. [6] . A dishonest participant prepares a multi-photon instead of a legal single-photon and sends it to another participant. Then he measures the photons with some photon number splitter (PNS) and detectors. The attack introduces no error into the communication.
Qin et al. [8] showed another attack scheme against MQSS protocol proposed by Ref. [6] . A dishonest participant prepares the fake state (|01 12 − |10 12 )/ √ 2 and then sends the first qubit to another participant. After receiving the first qubit operated, the dishonest participant can know another participant's operation I, U, H or H by measuring qubits 1, 2 in the basis {(|01 − |10 )/ √ 2, (|00 + |11 )/ √ 2, (|00 − |01 − |10 − |11 )/2, (|00 + |01 + |10 − |11 )/2}. The attack also introduces no error into the communication.
Participants can pick out a subset of the photons as the sample for eavesdropping check. Deng et al. [7] proposed that participants split each signal of the sample with a PNS and measure the two signals. Qin et al. [8] proposed that participants replace the sample photons with decoy photons.
In a threshold quantum cryptography, assumption that all the participants are honest is infeasible. The t-outof-n quantum cash threshold protocol proposed by Tokunaga et al. [9] is not secure. With the help of the attack schemes proposed in [7, 8] , the first participant P 1 , called a center in [9] , can completely eavesdrop t − 1 secret inputs kept by t − 1 other participants in a issuing phase one by one, and then reconstructs the copies of quantum cash that can pass the checking phase.
The sample photons schemes [7, 8] can improve the security of the threshold quantum protocol [9] . However the number of qubits of the generated quantum state by the threshold protocol must exceed that of the quantum state generated by the original (nonthreshold) protocol. We do not follow this line of argument. Instead we modify the protocol in the two-qubit quantum operation.
A quantum computation consists of three constituents: generating quantum states, performing unitary operations and measuring quantum states. The dishonest participants whose number is less than threshold number can generate the fake quantum states or perform the fake unitary operations to attack one other's input, but before measurement, they must reconstruct the legal quantum state to avoid the detection. In this paper, a honest measurer is assumed .
In this paper, instead of one-qubit operators, we show that two-qubit operators based on Grovers algorithm [10] can adapt to threshold quantum cryptography protocol. Each participant does one of eight kinds of operations on every two-qubit as input. The dishonest participants can eavesdrop 2 bits of 3 bits operation information on one two-qubit at most with whether fake signal or legal signal. The dishonest participants have to introduce 3 8 error probability into one two-qubit when they eavesdrop maximum information quantity 2 bits. These properties guar-antee the proposed threshold quantum protocol against an attack with a fake signal. Moreover, since even the three-qubit Grover's algorithm has been experimentally realized [11] , threshold quantum cryptography protocol based on Grover's algorithm becomes highly practical for experimental realization. avesdrop 2 bits of 3 bits operation information on one two-qubit with error probability 3/8.
In this paper, we propose a detection scheme to distinguish one single-qubit from one multi-qubit without destroying the legal qubit. The scheme can detect one multi-qubit instead of one single-qubit with probability 1 2 . So a Trojan horse attack [7, 12] can be resisted. This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces two-qubit operators based on Grovers algorithm [10] . Section III proposes an t-out-of-n quantum cash threshold protocol followed the line sketched in [9] but with some relevant differences. Section IV then shows security of the threshold protocol. Section V proofs that Trojan horse attack can be detected. Section VI then draws some conclusions.
II. TWO-QUBIT OPERATIONS BASED ON GROVER'S ALGORITHM
Grover's operator [10] in the two-qubit case
can transform the basis {|00 , |01 , |10 and |11 } to the basis {|00 = 1/2(−|00 + |01 + |10 + |11 ), |01 = 1/2(|00 − |01 + |10 + |11 ), |10 = 1/2(|00 + |01 − |10 + |11 ) and |11 = 1/2(|00 + |01 + |10 − |11 )}. A permutation operator
has properties:
, and U |11 = |00 . V and U are commute operators. In the threshold quantum proposed below, a center does one of eight kinds unitary operation on two-qubit:
where I is identity operator.
III. T-OUT-N THRESHOLD SCHEME
We propose the t-out-of-n threshold version of quantum cash protocol. There are three differences between our protocol and the protocol proposed by Tokunaga et al. [9] mainly: one is the assumption of dishonest participants instead of that of honest participants, one is two-qubit operation instead of one-qubit operation to resist the attack proposed by [8] , the other is an additional detection to resist the Trojan horse attack [7, 12] . Following the line sketched in [9] , We describe the scheme in detail.
Distribution phase. In this phase, a dealer distributes shared secrets to centers.
(i) A dealer chooses an original secret
for each banknote with L k , where L k is a kind of serial number (used as a label for K) and a i , b i are uniformly chosen, a i ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, b i ∈ {0, 1} (ii) The dealer then makes n shares, S 1 , ..., S n , of K using Shamir's secret sharing scheme [13] over F 2 N as follows, where N = 3m. The dealer chooses x j 's for j = 1, ..., n which are n distinct, nonzero elements in F 2 N , and the x j 's are published with L K . The dealer randomly chooses a secret (t − 1)th-degree polynomial
(iii) The dealer secretly sends S j with L K to center P j for each j = 1, ..., n.
Precomputation phase. In this phase, the centers compute the preliminary information for the following collaborative procedure. The preliminary information depends on which subset of centers is chosen to collaborate. Here, for simplicity of description, we assume that t centers, P 1 , ..., P t , collaborate to issue quantum banknotes or check their validity. Note that the set of collaborative centers can be different in each issuing or checking phase.
(i) For each j = 1, ..., t, P j calculates and secretly stores the following value (given by the Lagrange interpolation formula):
be the binary representation of K j in F 2 N , where a
[j]
i ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, b
i ∈ {0, 1}. Although each secret value S j (and K j ) is kept in each center P j locally, these values satisfy the following equations globally:
over F 2 N . In binary representation, Eq.(6) can be written as
where ⊕ represents bitwise exclusive-OR. Note that even in the following collaboration procedure,
) is kept secret at P j and the original secret K(K [j] ) is not recovered.
Issuing phase. In this phase, t centers collaborate to issue a banknote (L K , |φ ). Here, we assume the t centers are P 1 , ..., P t . Hereafter, we will describe a sequential protocol from P 1 to P t , but the order is not essential, any order is possible.
(i) P 1 generates a quantum state
where |ψ a
is defined as follow:
The value of b i determines the kind of the basis. If
) from P j−1 , he detects the Trojan horse attack and acts his secret input on |φ [j−1] . Our detection scheme is depicted in Fig. 1 . To each qubit |d of |φ [j−1] , called data qubit, P j uniformly choices auxiliary qubit |a ∈ {|0 , |1 }, acts Hadamard gate on |a , performs one CNOT gates on the auxiliary qubit and the data qubit (the former is the controller and the latter is the target), performs the unitary transformation
on the auxiliary qubit and the data qubit, and measures the auxiliary qubit in basis {|0 , |1 }. To legal single qubit |d , T · Cnot · (H ⊗ I) = I ⊗ I, so the auxiliary qubit keeps. In Section V, we proof that the detection scheme can detect a multi-qubit instead of a single-qubit with probability 1 2 . If the auxiliary qubit flips, a singlequbit must be replaced by a multi-qubit, so P j reject the banknote.
P j applies the following transformation
where
P j then obtains |φ [j] by the unitary transformation
and sends (L K , |φ [j] ) to P j+1 (P t+1 is the user whom the banknote is issued to ).
Checking phase. In this phase, t centers collaborate to check the validity of quantum banknote (L K , |φ ′ ). Here, we assume the t centers are P ′ 1 , . . . , P ′ t . This set of t centers can be different from the set of centers that collaborate to issue the banknote. Each P ′ j has calculated 
Additionally, P ′ j chooses a secret 
is the trusted measurer).
(ii) Finally, the trusted measurer requires P 
The trusted measurer then checks whether c i = 00 for all i = 1, . . . , m. Even if just one result is not 00, the centers reject the banknote. Necessity of the trusted measurer: If (L K , |φ ′ ) is an invalid quantum banknote, a dishonest measurer can always deceive the centers by announcing (c 1 , . . . , c m )=(00, . . . , 00). So an honest measurer is necessary. It is also necessary that the trusted measurer receives the value x
[j]′ secretly, otherwise the center P ′ t can always send the quantum states |φ
[t]′ = |00 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |00 to deceive the trusted measurer. 
IV. SECURITY PROOF
The impossibility of Eve's eavesdropping in the threshold protocol was shown using the quantum key distribution approach, following the line sketched in [14] .
The eavesdropping is restricted to a dishonest participant in the following.
A dishonest participant, called Bob, is an evil quantum physicist able to build all devices that are allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics. Her aim is to find out another participant's input and then to reconstruct the quantum cash with t−2 other participants. Bob prepares a fake signal and sends it to a participant, called Alice. Then from the fake signal operated by the Alice, Bob tries to gain Alice's input.
Without loss of generality, we assume that Alice does one of eight kinds of operations on every two-qubit with equal probability and that every two-qubit operation is independent. So it is sufficient to consider Bob's eavesdropping on one two-qubit.
Bob's fake signal can be presented as |θ = |00 (a|A + b|B + c|C + d|D ) + |01 (e|A + f |B + g|C + h|D ) + |10 (i|A + j|B + k|C + q|D ) + |11 (m|A + n|B + r|C + s|D ), where |A , |B , |C , and |D are normalized orthogonal states, and |a| 2 + |b| 2 + |c| 2 + |d| 2 + |e| 2 + |f | 2 + |g| 2 +|h| 2 +|i| 2 +|j| 2 +|k| 2 +|q| 2 +|m| 2 +|n| 2 +|r| 2 +|s| 2 = 1. For simplicity, we regard every probability amplitude as real number, but the security proof is fitted for plural number. Bob sends the former two-qubit to Alice and leaves the rest himself.
Alice encodes her input bit by applying one of eight kinds of operations with equal probability. The state reads
With the matrix form, the mixed state can be represented as
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The mutual information between Bob and Alice that can be extracted from this state is given by the von-Neumann entropy, I (Alice,Bob)≤ S(w) = T r{wlog 2 w}. In order to calculate the von-Neumann entropy, we need the eigenvalues λ of w, which are the roots of the characteristic polynomial det(w). Equivalently, we compute the roots of the characteristic polynomial det(XwX + ), yielding the 16 eigenvalues
where 
So we have Bob's eavesdropping introduces error into quantum state. Bob can not gain Alice's input from the two-qubit operated by both Alice and her next participant. Bob has to measure the two-qubit to extract Alice's input before one two-qubit is resent. To eavesdrop 2 bits operation information, Bob gains the maximal mixed state 
V. TROJAN HORSE ATTACK CAN BE DETECTED
A Trojan horse attack bases on the idea that we can precisely know an unknown quantum state by measuring many copies of the state. Let Bob prepare the multiqubit i1i2...im a i1i2...im |i 1 i 2 . . . i m 1,2,...m (m ≥ 2) to replace one data qubit |d .
In the detection scheme of the Trojan horse arrack (Fig. 1) , Alice prepares an auxiliary qubit |a = |0 or |a = |1 .
After the operation H|a , the system state is
Here we use superscripts 0 and 1 to denote the states corresponding to a = 0 and a = 1, respectively. This notation also applies to the following equations and we will, for simplicity, suppress the word "or" later. Instead of the operator C ad , the operators C a1 , C a2 , . . . , C am are performed. The system state is where 0 = 1, 1 = 0, and τ (x 1 x 2 . . . x n ) represents the number of x k x k+1 = 11 (k = 1, 2, . . . n − 1), for example, τ (1100111) = 3, τ (1011011) = 2. The detection scheme can detect a multi-qubit instead of a single-qubit with probability Additionally verifying the cases of m = 2, 3, we can conclude that when measuring the auxiliary qubit, if we gain |1 in the |η 0 3 with probability α, we must gain |0 in the |η 1 3 with probability 1 − α. So the auxiliary qubit flips with probability 1 2 . Since the detection is a linear operation applied to quantum state, it will work not only with pure states, but also with mixed states. For example, Bob sends the legal state |00 or many copies of |00 to Alice, the mixed state inputs the detection. With two auxiliary qubits, Alice can detect the case of many copies of |00 with probability 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a threshold quantum protocol based on two-qubit operation. The number of qubits of the generated quantum state by the threshold protocol equals to that of the quantum state generated by the original (nonthreshold) protocol. Fake signal attack strategy and Trojan horse attack strategy of the dishonest participant are investigated. The proposed protocol is shown to resist these attacks.
The proposed two-qubit operation based on Grover's algorithm can also be included in QSDC protocols and MQSS protocols. The proposed detection scheme of Trojan horse attack can be included in the other quantum cryptography protocols.
